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HUMAN CLONING: A CHOICE OR AN ECHO?
George J. Annas"

I. INTRODUCTION

The chant is "cloning, cloning, cloning"; but the echo is "choice,
choice, choice." From all the hoopla about human cloning as a human
choice it would seem that cloning must be the most important scientific
issue of our age. My intent in this Commentary is not to join this chorus,
but to take advantage of cloning's high visibility to explore the nature of
the choice it offers. What is it that makes human cloning at once so
appealing to a few and so repulsive to most? The answer, I think, can be
found in Roman mythology: Cloning recalls Ovid's myth of Echo and
Narcissus.
Echo was a devastatingly beautiful woodland nymph who had one
flaw, a fondness for chatter and an insistence on having the last word. One
day Echo detained the goddess Juno with her chatter while Jove, who was
cavorting with the nymphs, made his escape. When she discovered Echo's
treachery, Juno cursed Echo, saying that she would henceforth only have
the last word, but never the power to speak first. When Echo later pursued
Narcissus, a beautiful youth, she could not speak to him, but could only
repeat his last words. He rejects her, and she pines away until her bones
change to rock and nothing is left but her reply voice.
Narcissus, who was equally cruel to all women, was ultimately cursed
himself and fell in love with his own reflection, which he admired greatly.
Being unable to attain it, and being shunned by it, he was ultimately
consumed by his passion for his reflection and pined away and died. In
cloning terms, Narcissus can be seen as the clonee, and his reflection as his
clone. Echo is the personification of the curse that the clonee passes to its
clone: never to speak first, but always to repeat that which has gone before.
The lesson from mythology is clear: Duplicating yourself is sterile, selfabsorbed, and ultimately destructive. Moreover, creating a clone in your
own image is to curse your child by condemning it to be only an echo.
The myth of Echo and Narcissus helps explain the almost universal
horror to the prospect of human cloning that greeted the news in 1997 that
embryologist Ian Wilmut had cloned a sheep, creating the genetic twin of
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an adult animal by reprogramming one of its somatic cells to act as the
nucleus of an egg.' He called the cloned lamb Dolly. This achievement
was trumpeted as a scientific milestone. Debate about its implications for
human cloning began immediately. Should this cloning technique be
applied to humans? Who should decide and on what basis? Could human
cloning be stopped?
The international press featured photographs of Dolly, usually
duplicated one or more times, and often accompanied by bad puns (e.g.,
Could there ever be another ewe?, Cloning is baaad.).
The most
provocative cover appeared in the French edition of CourrierInternational,
which ran photos of twenty-one identical sheep with the headline "DessineMoi un Homme" (Draw Me a Man).' These words would immediately
bring to the mind of most French readers perhaps the twentieth century's
most famous fable, The Little Prince? The little prince introduces himself
to pilot-philosopher Antoine de Saint Exupery, who has just crash-landed
in the desert, with the words "Draw me a sheep" (Dessine-moi un mouton).
Saint Exupery was unable to draw a sheep to the liking of the little prince,
and in exasperation drew him a box with holes in it that he says houses a
sheep. This unseen sheep completely satisfies the prince. Dessine-moi un
homme suggests that, like the prince, -we will never be satisfied with the
results of human cloning because the clone will never live up to our image
of what it should be.
We can learn a lot from the almost universal condemnation of human
cloning and the international movement to ban it even if we never create a
delayed or serial genetic twin of an existing human.' The most important
things we can learn will likely be about life, not science, about values, not
technique-things, like the prince's sheep, that are "invisible to the eye."
The reason Ian Wilmut, and leaders around the world, called for a ban on
applying cloning to humans is that the genetic replication of a human by
cloning could radically alter the very definition of a human being by
asexually replicating an existing or deceased human to produce the world's
first human with a single genetic parent.' The danger is that through

Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385
NATURE 810 (1997).
2

Clonage Humain, COURRIER INT'L (France), Mar. 12, 1997, at 1.

3

ANTOINE DE SAINT EXUPERY, LE PETIT PRINCE 11 (5th ed. 1940).

The delayed or serial genetic twin is an identical twin that is born later than its genetic twin.
The source of the later born genetic twin could be either embryo splitting or nuclear substitution.
5 The single genetic parent provides the nucleus from a somatic cell which is transferred into an
egg from which the nucleus has been removed. Joan Stephenson, Threated Bans on Human Cloning
Research Could HamperAdvances, 277 JAMA 1023 (1997).
4
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human cloning we will lose something vital to our humanity, the
uniqueness of every human. Cloning a human is also uniquely disturbing
because it is the manufacture of a person made to order, it represents the
potential loss of individuality and freedom, and it symbolizes science's
unrestrained quest for mastery over nature for the sake of knowledge,
power, and profits. Cloning can also be seen as undermining our very
concepts of parenthood, parental responsibility, fertility, and the status and
value of children.
Cloning can also be categorized as just another reproductive choice
for infertile couples trying to have a baby, or as just another area of
scientific research that scientists should have the choice to pursue. Choice
is the overarching subject and theme of this Commentary, and I begin the
exploration of the power of choice rhetoric with the debate over human
cloning because human cloning itself is not currently possible, and may
never be. Human cloning is a hypothetical and remote future choice for
others, probably not yet born, that some Americans nonetheless want to
preserve. Choice for its own sake.
II. CLONING AND IMAGINATION

For a brief time, in the early 1970s, human cloning was a centerpiece
issue in bioethical debates in the United States. After the birth of Louise
Brown, the world's first IVF ("in vitro fertilization") baby in 1978,
however, it became tangential. The President's Bioethics Commission, for
example, devoted only a single footnote to cloning in its 1982 report on
genetic manipulation, Splicing Life. The footnote concluded: "The
technology to clone a human does not-and may never-exist. Moreover,
the critical nongenetic influences on development make it difficult to
imagine producing a human clone who would act or appear 'identical."' 6
And although cloning reemerged as a major bioethics issue in the popular
press in October 1993, the NIH ("National Institutes of Health") Human
Embryo Research Panel Report on human embryo research in September
1994 devoted only a single footnote to this type of cloning: "Popular
notions of cloning derive from science fiction books and films that have
more to do with cultural fantasies than actual scientific experiments."'
6

PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS

IN MEDICINE

AND

BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF
GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 9 n.5 (1982).
7 HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PUB. No. 95-3916,
REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL (1994). For a summary of the Human Embryo
Research Panel's findings, see George J. Annas et al., The Politics of Human Embryo Research:
Avoiding Ethical Gridlock, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1329, 1329-32 (1996).
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Scientists themselves have always taken human cloning more
seriously. Joshua Lederberg summarized many of the arguments for and
against governmental regulation of cloning in his 1966 essay
"Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution."8 And James Watson, the
co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, argued in 1971 for a serious
discussion of human cloning that might lead to a "blanket declaration of
the worldwide illegality of human cloning." Some bioethicists took up the
challenge. Paul Ramsey used Lederberg's arguments as a starting point for
his own arguments against cloning."0 Joseph Fletcher, on the other hand,
argued not only in favor of cloning ("if the greatest good of the greatest
number"" could be thus served) but also in favor of biodesigning
parahumans or 'modified men'-as chimeras (part animal) or cyborgandroids (part prostheses)."2
Scientific musings and ethical discussions of cloning garnered
Congressional interest as well. In 1972, a Congressional subcommittee
asked the Library of Congress to study the status of genetic engineering. 3
Among other things, the resulting report dealt specifically with cloning and
parthenogenesis applied to humans. "4 Although the report concluded that
the cloning of human beings by nuclear substitution "is not now possible,"
its authors wrote that cloning "might be considered an advanced type of
genetic engineering" if combined with the introduction of highly desirable
DNA to "achieve some ultimate objective in genetic engineering."' 5
Cloning, in other words, not as a replicative evolutionary dead end, but to
try to make improvements to existing human genotypes. The report called
for assessment and detailed knowledge, forethought and evaluation of the
course of genetic developments, rather than "acceptance of the haphazard
evolution of the techniques of genetic engineering [in the hope that] the
issues will resolve themselves."' 6

8

Joshua Lederberg, Experimental Genetics and Human Evolution, 100 AM. NATURALIST 519

(1966).
9

James D. Watson, Moving Toward the Clonal Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1971, at 50,

50-53.
10 PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL (1970).
I1 JOSEPH FLETCHER, THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL: ENDING REPRODUCTIVE ROULETTE

154-56 (1988).
12 Id. at 172-73.
13 SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIV., LIBR. OF CONG., 92D CONG., 2D. SEss.,
ENGINEERING: EVOLUTION OF A TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUE III (Comm. Print 1972).
14 Id.at 21.
15 Id. at 22.
16

Id. at 44.
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Six years later, in 1978, a subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on human cloning in
response to the publication of David Rorvick's The Cloning of a Man. 7
All of the scientists who testified assured the committee that the account of
the cloning of a human being was fictional and that the techniques
described in the book could not work." One scientist testified that he
hoped that by showing that the book was false it would also become
apparent that the issue of human cloning itself "is a false one, that the
apprehensions people have about cloning of human beings are totally
unfounded."' 9 The major point the scientists wanted to make, however,
was that they did not want any laws enacted that might affect their
research. In the words of one, "There is no need for any form of regulatory
legislation, and it could only in the long run have a harmful effect."20
Rorvik purported to tell a true story of Max, a wealthy man who
wanted help to find a physician who would clone the avowed bachelor,
surviving twin, and orphan. A physician with the unlikely code name of
Darwin was found, and laboratory facilities were constructed in a remote
country. Surrogate mothers were commandeered without knowledge or
consent, and eventually a clone was successfully implanted into one of
them, named Sparrow. She was secretly flown to California just prior to
the birth of Max's clone and heir. Rorvik's tale makes good reading, and it
summarizes most of the ethical and scientific arguments about cloning
well. Unfortunately, the ensuing public debate on cloning centered not on
the ethical issues but on whether or not the book was a hoax. This, of
course, missed the point. The book was an elaborate fable and presented a
valuable opportunity to discuss the ethical implications of cloning. The
failure to see it as a fable was a failure of imagination. We normally do not
look to novels for scientific knowledge, but they provide more-insights
into life itself." The issues Rorvik unearthed were quickly reburied.
Like ethical debate, Congressional discussion of human cloning was
interrupted by the birth of Louise Brown in 1978. The ability to conceive a
child outside the human body not only added a new way (in addition to
artificial insemination) for humans to reproduce without sex but also made

17 DAVID M. RORVIK, IN His IMAGE: THE CLONING OFA MAN (1978).

18 Developments in Cell Biology and Genetics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Enviroment of the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
19
20

Id.at 26.
Id. at 27.

21

JOHN HORGAN, THE END OF SCIENCE 152-53 (1996). "It is quite possible-overwhelmingly

probable one might guess-that we will always learn more about human life and human personality
from novels than from scientific psychology." Id. (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND
PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 159 (1988)).
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it possible for the first time for a woman to gestate and give birth to a child
to whom she had no genetic relationship. Since 1978 a child can have at
least five parents: a genetic and rearing father, and a genetic, gestational,
and rearing mother. We pride ourselves as having adapted to this brave
new biological world, but in fact we have yet to develop reasonable and
enforceable rules for even so elementary a question as, "Who, among these
five possible parents, should the law recognize as parents with rights and
obligations to the child?" Many other serious problems, including embryo
storage and disposition, posthumous use of gametes, and information
available to the child regarding genetic and birth parents also remain
unresolved.22
IVF represents a striking technological approach to infertility;
nonetheless, the child is still conceived by the union of an egg and sperm
from two human beings of the opposite sex. Even though no change in the
genetics and biology of embryo creation and growth is at stake in IVF,
society continues to wrestle with fundamental issues involving this method
of reproduction twenty years after its introduction. For example, now that
we can separate genetic from gestational motherhood, we must
acknowledge that the resulting child has two mothers and determine which
(or both) society should consider "the" mother of the child. Mother
identification is also an issue in cloning (which will not only always
require both an egg donor who will contribute mitochondrial DNA to the
child and a woman to gestate the clone but could also add yet a third
mother-the nucleus donor). Attorney Nanette Elster has identified
thirteen different parental configurations in human cloning with four to ten
competitors for the status of parent. 3
Twinning by splitting an extracorporeal human embryo in two is the
most rudimentary form of human cloning, and the closest to natural twins.
The primary justification for embryo splitting has been to improve the
efficiency of IVF, and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
("ASRM") has justified research on embryo splitting as a possible way to
improve the efficiency of IVF. ASRM's ethics committee cautions,
however, that all twinned embryos should be implanted and gestated
together to prevent the copy-original "delayed twin" problem that is at the
center of the cloning debate.

22 George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, Social Policy Considerations
in Noncoital Reproduction,
255 JAMA 62 (1986).
23 Chicago-Kent College of Law, Is Human Cloning
on the Horizon? (Dec. 5, 1997) (press
release, on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
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This is because cloning of existing humans is replication, not
reproduction, and represents a difference in kind, not in degree, in the
manner in which human beings reproduce. Cloning has nothing inherently
to do either with infertile couples or natural twins because women would
be able to replicate themselves without male involvement, and without a
limit of one clone at a time or per women. Asexual cloning by nuclear
substitution represents such a discontinuity in the way humans reproduce.
It is such a challenge to human dignity (by limiting the clone's life choices)
and so devalues human life (by comparing the "original" to the "copy" in
terms of which is to be more valued) that even the search for an analogy
has come up empty-handed. This discontinuity means that although the
constitutional right not to reproduce would seem to apply with equal force
to a right not to replicate, to the extent that there is a constitutional right to
reproduce if one is able, no existing liberty doctrine would extend this right
to replication by cloning. One could, of course, drastically stretch existing
doctrine to encompass replications. As the law now stands, choice is an
insufficient justification for human cloning. We must probe deeper-and
we can, by sitting our discussion on the operating table of science fiction.
III.

CLONING AND SCIENCE FICTION

The witnesses at the 1978 Congressional hearing should have taken
Rorvik's fictional account more seriously and used it as an opportunity to
explore the public policy issues raised by his scenario, rather than
attempting to discredit the book's factual premise. This mistake has been
made repeatedly. The President's Bioethics Commission in 1981 and the
NIH Embryo Panel in 1994 each failed to use the wide-ranging fiction
literature on human cloning to inform their deliberations. And in 1997,
when President Clinton asked his National Bioethics Advisory Board
("NBAC") to make recommendations about human cloning, the panel
members failed again. Although acknowledging in their report that human
cloning has always seemed the stuff of "science fiction" rather than
science, the group did not commission even one background paper on how
science fiction writing informs the debate. This is a fundamental error that
prompts us to treat cloning as just another choice along the American
highway of ever-increasing choices.
Fiction has probably done more than anything else to produce
society's reaction to cloning-a mixture of fascination and horror-as
exemplified by films such as Blade Runner, Sleeper, Jurassic Park, and
Multiplicity. In Multiplicity, for example, a full-grown adult twin can be
produced in two hours. This is totally outside even scientific speculation,
although a similar technique was employed in an episode of Star Trek:

HUMAN CLONING
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The Next Generation. In both of these dramas, repeated cloning produces
errors and degeneration much the way repeated "xeroxing" of copies
does.24 The Star Trek crew, a group committed to scientific exploration
and open to virtually any new experience or culture, rejects cloning as
fundamentally opposed to basic human values.
Literary treatments of cloning have gone deeper. Cloning was the
basis for governing Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. The key to social
control in Huxley's society was the "Bokanovsky Process," in which a
single embryo is stimulated to divide into ninety-six identical copies.
These ninety-six embryos (or all the survivors, eighty-two on average) are
then artificially gestated together under identical conditions designed to
produce five classes of workers: Alphas, Betas, Deltas, Gammas, and
Epsilons in descending order. Specific "batches" were conditioned to
perform specific tasks and to love performing them.
Other novels have explored nongovernmental uses of cloning. In Ira
Levin's The Boys from Brazil Mengele succeeds in creating 94 clones of
Adolf Hitler. The idea of ninety-four Hitlers is a horrible one. Readers of
the book, however, quickly realize that a Hitler clone would grow up in a
far different world than Hitler did, and that environment and learning
would result in a very different person. As the Nazi-hunter Liebermann
puts it near the end of the novel, "I say in my talks it takes two things to
make it happen again, a new Hitler and social conditions like in the thirties.
But that's not true. It takes three things: the Hitler, the conditions ... and
the people to follow the Hitler.""5 Liebermann decides the real issue is not
genetics, but human values. The children are not Hitler, no matter how
identical their genetic makeup; and by killing them the Nazi-hunters would
become what they despised: children killers. Liebermann explains to
Rabbi Gorin that although Mengele thought he could produce another
Hitler through cloning, this was "his project, his ambition." "It could be
that none will be ... what their genes are. Children. How can we kill
them? This was Mengele's business, killing children."" The lesson is that
a clone, even a clone of Hitler, is an individual human being with all the
rights to life of any other human person.
In Fay Weldon's The Cloning of Joanna May we witness four clones
develop into four very different women. The wealthy Carl May secretly
clones his wife after he discovers she has been unfaithful to him. When
she later learns of the existence of the four clones of herself she thinks:

24

Xerox is a registered trademark of The Xerox Corporation, registration number 1010557.

25

IRA LEVIN, THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL 261 (1976).

26
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I am horrified, I am terrified, I don't know what to do with myself at all,
whatever myself means now. I don't want to meet myself, I'm sure. I would
look at myself with critical eyes, confound myself. I would see what I don't
want to see, myself when young. I would see not immortality, but the
I can't
inevitability of age and death. As I am, so they will become ....
even kill myself-they will go on. Now night will never fall."
Personal identity is at the heart of objections to human cloning. The
loss of personal identity is well-recognized by the clone's following the
already-lived life of its genetically identical parent--original. Weldon
argues that clones can undermine the lives of their genetic original as well.
Joanna, nonetheless, seems to forgive her former husband on his death bed,
and agrees to his dying wish: to raise his own clone. The author thus
poses, but does not resolve, the issue of whether posthumous cloning is
better or worse than cloning during one's lifetime. The knowledge that
one's life choices have been limited, if not defined, by the choices of one's
parent is a terrible burden. As Kirsten Banks puts it in her evocative Lives
of the Monster Dogs (dogs bred for intelligence, and given speech and
hands so they can be soldiers), "It is a terrible thing to be a dog [clone] and
know it."2
What could the various panels have learned about cloning from an
examination of these works of science fiction? That there are a wide
variety of possible motives for cloning. That cloning is an evolutionary
dead end that can only replicate what already exists-not improve it. That
cloning is not about infertile couples or twins born together, but about
replicating an indefinite number of genetic duplicates of an existing human
That
being.
That exact replication of a human is not possible.
governments, corporations, wealthy individuals, and rogue scientists might
all want to do cloning experiments, many because they misunderstand what
is possible-that clones must be accorded the same human rights as
persons as other humans. And they could have understood that personal
identity, human dignity, and parental responsibility are at the core of the
cloning debate.
Literary treatments of cloning help explain why applying this
technology to humans might undermine our concepts of human life,
responsibility, and relationships. Dolly's "creator," Ian Wilmut, has
consistently argued that his cloning technique should not be applied to
humans. He has not used literature to bolster his argument, but he could.
The reporter who described Wilmut as "Dolly's laboratory father," for
example, probably could not have conjured up images of Mary Shelley's

27

FAY WELDON, THE CLONING OF JOANNA MAY

28

KIRSTEN BAKIS, LIVES OF THE MONSTER DOGS

121 (1990).
138 (1997).
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Frankenstein better if he had tried. Frankenstein was also his creature's
father/god; the creature tells him: "I ought to be thy Adam." Like Dolly,
the "spark of life" was infused into the creature by electric current. Unlike
Dolly, the creature was created fully grown (not a cloning possibility, but
what many Americans fantasize and fear), and wanted more than
creaturehood: He wanted a mate of his "own kind" with whom to live and
reproduce. Frankenstein reluctantly agreed to manufacture such a mate if
the creature agreed to leave humankind alone. But in the end, he viciously
destroys the female creature-mate, concluding that he has no right to inflict
the children of this pair, "a race of devils," upon "everlasting generations."
Frankenstein ultimately recognized his responsibilities to humanity, and
Shelley's great novel explores virtually all the noncommercial elements of
today's cloning debate.
The naming of the world's first cloned mammal also has great
significance. The sole survivor of 277 cloned embryos (or "fused
couplets"), the clone could have been named after its sequence in this
group (e.g., C-137), but this would have only emphasized its character as a
produced product. In stark contrast, the name Dolly (provided for the
public and not used in the scientific report in Nature, where she is
identified as 6LL3) suggests a unique individual. Whether Wilmut actually
adopted this name because, as he has said, he used a mammary cell for the
cloning, and Dolly Parton has famous mammary glands, is unimportant.
The name Dolly works at many levels. Even at the manufactured level, a
doll evokes joy in our children and is itself harmless. Victor Frankenstein,
of course, never named his creature, thereby repudiating any parental
responsibility. Naming the world's first mammal-clone Dolly is meant to
distance her from the Frankenstein myth both by making her something she
is not (a doll) and by accepting parental responsibility for her.29 The name
Dolly thus serves as a semantic intermediary that makes passage from
rejection to acceptance possible.
Unlike Shelley's Frankenstein, Aldous Huxley's Brave New World
future, in which all humans are created by cloning through embryo splitting

29 When I raised this issue at Senate hearings on cloning on March 12, 1997, Senator Thomas
Harkin (D-lowa) reacted quite negatively, suggesting that use of Frankenstein imagery was an attempt
to scare the public, and that, regardless, "cloning will continue." Capitol Hill Addresses the Ethics of
Cloning (CNN television newscast, Mar. 12, 1997) (transcript available in LEXIS, News/CNN file);
see Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Pub. Health & Safety, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1997) (statement of Senator Harkin). The author's
prepared testimony is available at: George J. Annas, Senator Frist,I greatly appreciatethe opportunity
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www-busph.bu.edu/depts/lw/clonetest.htm>; Scientific Discoveries in
Cloning: Challengesfor Public Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Health & Safety,
105th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1997) (statement of Author).
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and conditioned to join a specified worker group, was always unlikely.
There are much more efficient ways of creating killers or terrorists (or even
soldiers and workers) than through cloning. Physical and psychological
conditioning can turn teenagers into terrorists in a matter of months-far
easier than waiting some eighteen to twenty years for the clones to grow up
and be trained themselves. Cloning has no real military or paramilitary
uses. As discussed, even Hitler's clone would himself be a quite different
person than the Hitler original because he would grow up in a radically
altered world environment.
Science fiction helps us to articulate and understand the major social
policy issues raised by attempting to clone a human; but it cannot make us
apply its lessons. In deciding how to proceed, society has four basic policy
models to choose from: the market model," professional standards,3 '
government regulation, 32 or an outright ban. 13
IV. THE MARKET MODEL
Both the genetics and bioethics communities have consistently
underestimated the power of market forces and commercialism to shape
the demand for and uses of new reproductive technologies. In fact, the
debates in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s are virtually silent about the likely role
of the market in setting the practice parameters of the new genetics. We
must not be so naive. Medicine itself is now widely viewed as a market
good, and the once-nightmare scenario has become a reality: Medicine has
4
become a business, and business ethics have eclipsed medical ethics.
The market is a utilitarian's dream. And it is in the market's
maximization of utility that its ideology unites with the libertarian belief in
the primacy of personal choice as the ruling value in society. In the market
all value preferences (choices) are measured in dollars. Private demand,
often itself created by advertising, creates incentives to supply the
demanded service to a point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
Advertising to promote IVF services, for example, has catapulted IVF
clinics into a billion-dollar annual business that continues to grow. In the
private market, private interests prevail; those with the money can purchase
services from willing sellers. Sellers themselves have the primary
See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
34 See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-IndustrialComplex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963
(1980).
30

31
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motivation of making profits, since the ideology of the marketplace is the
ideology of profit maximization.
We have a private market in sperm (donor insemination), ova (ova
donation), and IVF but have so far not developed a private market in
human embryos. In one horror scenario (which I suggested during the
1993 embryo splitting cloning debate could occur when and if human
embryo cloning becomes feasible) an embryo could be split or cloned a
number of times-say eight for the sake of argument. One would be
implanted and the rest frozen. After the implanted embryo develops, is
born, and is a few months old, its picture could be taken, and a complete
genetic profile of the child, possibly with some rough intelligence scores,
produced. The photo and information could then be placed in a catalog,
and the other seven embryos could be offered for sale on the basis that they
would produce children phenotypically exactly like the one pictured. This
method of embryo splitting follow by freezing of some embryos has all of
the problems of the "delayed twin" somatic cell cloning since the later born
genetic twins would have to follow in the genetic steps of their first born
twin. This is the same type of genetic bondage somatic cell clones must
endure. Nonetheless, this might prove commercially attractive, since many
people now select sperm donors, surrogate mothers, and ova donors based
on their physical characteristics from similar catalogs with no guarantee
that the desired characteristics will be inherited, and a genetic tie may be
seen as unimportant by some couples.
What would be wrong with this practice? The problem is that the
practice would set a price on all human characteristics (e.g., tall children
would be worth more on the market than short ones, thin worth more than
fat, etc.) and thus tend to commodify not only embryos but children
themselves. The problem of selling human embryos can be illustrated by
applying the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
demonstrating that at the least we will need new sales rules if we decide to
let the market rule in embryo distribution. The UCC provides, for
example, that goods can be rejected, and "if the seller gives no instructions
within a reasonable time after notification of rejection, the buyer may store
the rejected goods for the seller's account or reship them to him or resell
them for the seller's account."35 This could be read as applying more
directly to the frozen embryo itself, but its potential application to the child
produced as a result of the embryo transfer process simply illustrates the
inappropriateness of sales in this area at all, and the ease with which the
sale of embryos can quickly become confused with sale of children. A

35 U.C.C. § 2-604 (1995).
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simple way to stop commercialization in embryos before it starts is to
regulate or manage the market by prohibiting the purchase and sale of
human embryos, much the way we now prohibit the purchase and sale of
human organs and fetal tissues. A federal statute prohibiting commerce in
human embryos should be enacted.
It is worth noting that the major reason the cost of health care is out
of control in the United States is that medical goods are viewed as market
goods, and the individuals which deliver them, and the companies that
produce them, earn money based both on price and volume. As economist
Uwe Reinhardt has put it, "instead of necessity being the mother of
invention, [now in medicine] invention [is] the mother of necessity."36 He
seems correct. When something new is "invented" in medicine, be it a
drug or a procedure, its inventor immediately seeks to find or manufacture
reasons that it is "medically necessary" for as many people as possible.
For example, when IVF was first introduced into the United States in 1981,
it was to be used only to solve infertility problems that are otherwise
unsolvable (e.g., blocked fallopian tubes). Now, however, idiopathic
infertility is a sufficient indication. Likewise, it was not surprising to see
the George Washington University cloners explain in 1993 that their
"embryo splitting" procedure could be used to make IVF more efficient.
Efficiency, of course, is a market value, not a precept of medical ethics.
Free marketers and libertarian ethicists have already suggested that
there might be good reasons to clone a human. Perhaps most compelling is
cloning a dying child if this is what the grieving parents want. But this
should not be permitted. Not only does this encourage the parents to
produce one child in the image of another, it also encourages all of us to
view children as interchangeable commodities. The death of a child thus
need no longer be a singular human tragedy, but rather an opportunity to
try to duplicate the no longer priceless deceased child. Moreover, cloning
children demeans their personhood by denying them a say in their own
replication. When a child is cloned, it is not the parents that are being
replicated (or are "reproducing") but the child. The fact that all of the
child's DNA came from the parents does not diminish the child's
personhood or right to make his or her own reproductive choices. No one
should have such dominion over a child (even a dead or dying child) as to
be permitted to use its genes to create the child's child.
Population geneticist R.C. Lewontin has challenged my position that
the first human clone would also be the first human with a single genetic
parent by arguing that instead:

36
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A child by cloning has a full double set of chromosomes like anyone else,
half of which were derived from a mother and half from a father. It happens
that these chromosomes were passed through another individual, the cloning
donor, on their way to the child. That donor is certainly not the child's
'parent' in any biological sense, but simply an earlier offspring of the
original parents. 7
This position takes genetic reductionism to perhaps its logical extreme:
People become no more than containers of their parent's genes, and their
parents have the "right" to treat them not as individual human beings, but
rather like human embryos-entities that they can "split" and "replicate" at
their whim without any consideration of the child's choice or welfare.
Children (even adult children) under this view have no say in whether they
are replicated or not, because it is their parents, not them, who are
"reproducing." This radical redefinition of reproduction and the denial of
the choice to procreate or not of children turns out to be an even stronger
argument against cloning children than its biological novelty.
Humans have a basic right not to reproduce, and human reproduction
(even replication) is not like reproducing farm animals, or even pets.
Ethical human reproduction properly requires the voluntary participation of
the genetic parents, as Joanna May would certainly insist.38 This is one
reason, for example, why fetal eggs cannot be used for human
reproduction: Voluntary participation is not possible. Children are not
medicine or treatment (even for intense grief) and should not be used
solely as means to other people's ends. Related human rights and dignity
would also prohibit using cloned children as organ sources for their
father/mother original. Nor is there any "right to be cloned" that an adult
might possess that is triggered by marriage to someone with whom the
adult cannot reproduce. While it is possible to posit some scenarios in
which cloning could be used for infertility treatment, in all of them, having
children to rear by existing means is possible. The use of cloning simply
provides another choice for choice's sake, not out of necessity. Moreover,
in a fundamental sense cloning cannot be a treatment for infertility. This
replication technique changes the very concept of genetic infertility itself,
since all humans have somatic cells that could be used for replication.
My colleague John Robertson wrote the free marketer's guide to new
reproductive technologies in 1994, entitled Children of Choice.39 His basic
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thesis is that "procreative liberty" requires the government to keep out of
any private deals between adults and their physicians that might result in
the production of a child (assuming, of course, that the adults can pay the
price demanded by the physician to exercise this choice). Robertson, and
most IVF clinics, use the allure of children to make their quest seem
altogether benign and natural. Nonetheless, children have virtually no
place in either Robertson's book or in the practice of IVF clinics: The
market rules and no one in the entire contracting process speaks for the
future child.
In the cloning context Robertson adopts the same rationale to
discount our obligations to our children as he does with IVF generally: It
is impossible to harm a child of cloning because if cloning were not used,
the child would not exist at all. In his words:
[T]here is no unharmed state, other than nonexistence, that could be achieved
as a point of comparison. If cloning did not occur, the cloned individual
would not exist. If she had been given a-different genome, that is, not been
cloned, she would not be the same individual. Thus even if the clone suffers
inordinately from her replica status, there is no alternative for her if she is to
live at all. Unless the life ... were a wrong (an unlikely scenario), cloning

would then-whatever its psychosocial effects-not harm offspring."
This classic argument is actually a tautology. It applies to all of usnone of us would exist were it not for the precise and unpredictable time
the sperm from our father and egg from our mother met. This fact,
however, does not justify a conclusion that our parents had no obligations
to us as their future children. There are many ways to harm future children
prior to conception, and the fact that we, may not permit these harmed
children to sue their parents for damages because we are unable to compare
their damaged existence with no existence at all (the "choice" for them if
their parents had not decided to have children) does not mean that future
children can be manufactured in any way parents want. If it did, it would
be equally acceptable, from the child's perspective, to be gestated in a
great ape, or even a cow; or to be composed of a mixture of ape genes and
human genes. It would also be acceptable to make conjoined twins by
design. But in these cases real and predictable harm will be done to future
children, and this harm can be avoided. The biological fact that these
particular children would not exist but for great ape genes or great ape
gestation, or as conjoined twins, provides no ethical justification to visit
these harms on children by subjecting them to these manipulations. Harm
to the child is thus not the right (or at least not the only) question: It takes
children out of context by ignoring or marginalizing parental obligations
40
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and family ties and posits the morally untenable postulate that it is
acceptable to use any method to produce a child as long as that method is
likely to produce a child whose existence is preferable to nonexistence.
Daniel Callahan has put it another way: "Nowhere has anyone suggested
that cloning would advance the cause of children. And why should
anyone? . . . [Children] in our world do not suffer from an absence of
cloning."4
V. PROFESSIONAL GUIDELINES

Because IVF is a medical procedure, it has seemed reasonable to ask
the medical profession, through its specialty groups, to set standards not
only for IVF but for the entire range of assisted reproduction techniques,
and for research on these techniques as well. Control of IVF research was
de facto ceded to the medical profession by the United States government
when the Reagan and Bush administrations refused to provide federal
funding for embryo and IVF-related research and abandoned the Ethics
Advisory Board. This prompted fertility specialists to "skip" the research
phase altogether and move IVF immediately into clinical practice.
Research protocols like that used in the George Washington University
embryo cloning experiment are often reviewed only by local institutional
review boards ("IRBs").42 Such review is unimpressive because IRBs,
have no special expertise in embryo research, are composed primarily of
other researchers, meet in secret, and generally approve whatever projects
their colleagues want to perform. Today, Max would not have to secretly
hire a physician and have his cloning research done offshore. Max could
have funded his cloning experiment at any of a variety of private facilities
in the United States. Unless the facility chosen was affiliated with a
hospital or medical school, Max's cloning experiment would not have to be
reviewed by anyone.
Geneticist-obstetrician Sherman Elias and I have consistently urged
medical specialty organizations to set and follow standards of care, and
that in regard to reproductive technologies, "primary consideration should
always be given to the welfare and 'best interests' of the potential child."43
Unfortunately, to date the relevant professional associations have not been
able to move beyond the market-consumer model. Current practice is to
41
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provide consumer-patients whatever they want (and can pay for) rather
than attempt to develop a professional model that sets meaningful practice
and ethics standards, or that takes the welfare of resulting children
seriously.
Professional-organization ethics committees composed primarily of
practitioners are simply too narrow to be anything but self-serving in their
outlook and actions. A similar observation can be made concerning IRBs
and state licensing boards. We cannot expect physician-dominated groups
to protect the interests of patients any more than a guard-dominated group
would protect the interests of prisoners, a landlord-dominated group would
protect the interests of tenants, or a police-dominated group would protect
the interests of suspects. As my colleague Michael Baram put it more than
twenty years ago when he was teaching at MIT:
I do not think scientific peer groups presently have the objectivity or
capability to function as coherent and humane social controls. The members
of a peer group share the narrow confines of their discipline, and individual
success is measured by the degree to which one plunges more deeply into
and more narrowly draws the bounds of his research. There are no peer
group rewards for activities or perceptions that extend beyond the discipline
or relate it to social problems. Members are therefore neither motivated nor
trained to relate their peer group activity to broader social concerns ...
Self-enclosed peer groups cannot be entrusted with self control."
If anything has changed over the past twenty years, it is the
emergence of the market as an even stronger force in shaping professional
standards than professional self-identity. Professional organizations, of
course, exist to foster the interests of their members. Thus it is not
surprising that the ethics committees of these organizations exist primarily
to give ethical cover to the practices of their members. The 1994
publication of the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society
(now the American Society for Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM")), for
example, has thirty separate statements-not one is about children."
I have been a member of that ethics committee for the past four years.
In December 1995, when we were reviewing drafts of five position
papers,' I suggested that the committee's work to date supported the
following description of the committee's operating assumptions: (1) The
44 Michael S. Baram, Social Control of Science and Technology, 172 SCIENCE
537 (1971)
(concluding that self-enclosed peer groups cannot be entrusted with self-control).
45 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Fertility Soc'y, Ethical Considerations of Assisted Reproductive

Technologies, 62 FERTIL. & STERIL. i-ii (1994).
46 The position papers concerned oocyte donation to postmenopausal
women, use of fetal oocytes
in reproduction, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and sex selection, informed consent and the use of
gametes and embryos for research, and disposition of abandoned embryos.
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ethical acceptability of new reproductive technologies is assumed, and the
burden of proof is on anyone who would question a new technology to
show how its use is unethical; (2) A use of a new technology cannot be
declared unethical if there is any possible ethical application of that
technology, no matter how hypothetical; (3) It is assumed that imagined
new technologies will ultimately work and will produce benefit, and that
any imagined harms from the technology are speculative or can be
controlled unless proven otherwise; and (4) The major values to be taken
into account in evaluating new reproductive technologies are economic
(efficiency, supply, and cost) not ethical.
I rather naively thought that the committee would find these operating
assumptions threatening or at least embarrassing. I was wrong. Most of
the members simply found this assessment descriptive. As the chairman
put it, this is a generally accurate description of how the committee works:
If any good can be imagined from a new technology its use should not be
declared unethical. Whatever one thinks about this stance as applied to the
new reproductive technologies in general, it has been adopted by the
proponents of human cloning who argue that it is just another choice for
reproduction and should not be outlawed if any possible ethically
acceptable scenario, no matter how speculative, can be imagined. It is thus
notable that ASRM's governing board has taken a strong position against
somatic cell cloning-the first technique it has ever opposed.
If it is true that market values have been de facto incorporated into
professional medical values (and are often indistinguishable), then
professional ethics and practice standards provide no public protectiononly monopoly protection for the medical profession itself. We must then
turn to governmental regulation to "manage" medicine's market
competition in research related to the new reproductive technologies, as
well as clinical practice itself.
VI.

GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT

The United States is virtually unique in the developed world in its
hands-off attitude toward government regulation of embryo research
specifically, and the new reproductive technologies in general. Although
NIH did form an advisory panel to make recommendations about embryo
research in February 1994, prior to this there had been no federal activity in
this area since the Ethics Advisory Board was abandoned in 1979. This
lack of activity (and thus of oversight) was caused by the antiabortion
agenda of the Reagan and Bush administrations, which identified embryo
research with abortion and condemned all embryo research on the basis
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that human life begins at conception. This view has not ultimately
prevailed in either Congress or the United States Supreme Court, and
honest and open discussion and regulation of embryo research and human
cloning now seems possible. It is about time.
There are societal issues involved in embryo research and cloning,
especially regarding the rights of potential parents and the welfare of their
children, that demand governmental oversight.47 The United States has
long recognized the government's interest in protecting subjects of human
experimentation, most forcefully in the 1947 Nuremberg Code pronounced
by United States judges sitting in judgment of the Nazi physicians at
Nuremberg. Nor has Congress been silent, establishing a National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (1974-78), the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(1979-83), and the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee (1988-89).
This last body was unable to function because of its split on abortion, but
the other two produced important and useful ethical guidelines. A NIH
body, the Ethics Advisory Board (1977-79), also produced a set of useful
recommendations regarding IVF-related embryo research, as did a NIH
panel in 1994.
President Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Committee
("NBAC"), formed in the fall of 1996, continues this tradition. This is
laudable, but I believe it is time to move beyond an advisory committee
and establish a regulatory commission, a federal Human Experimentation
Agency ("HEA"), with both rule-making and adjudicatory authority in the
area of human experimentation. This would mean HEA could both
promulgate rules governing human research and have authority to review
and approve or disapprove research proposals in specific areas such as
xenografts, artificial organs, embryo research (including cloning), genetic
engineering, and other similar experiments that local IRBs are simply
incapable of meaningfully reviewing. HEA should also recommend
legislation to Congress, including, for example, a ban on the sale of human
embryos.
Finally, HEA could provide the United States with an
authoritative voice in the international arena, where cooperation will
become increasingly important.

47 In the spring of 1998, the New York Task Force on Life and the Law became the first public
body in the U.S. to review all of the new reproductive technologies, including embryo research and
cloning, and make legislative recommendations. NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, N.Y.
STATE HEALTH DEP'T, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC

POLICY (1998); see Lawrence K. Altman, Health Panel Seeks Sweeping Changes in Fertility Therapy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at AI, A21.
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An example helps illustrate why such an agency is needed. Cloning
is replication and as such holds little attraction or interest for people who
want to have children. Most of us want our children to have better lives
than we have had, not to repeat them. That is why, although it received
almost no public press, the experiment that Wilmut and his team published
at the end of 1997 was in many ways much more important than Dolly. In.
that experiment, human genes and gene markers were added to fetal cells,
and the resulting combined cells were used as nucleuses in enucleated
eggs. 48 As a result six transgenic lambs were born: three contained the
human gene for blood coagulation (factor IX).49 The potential (but far
futuristic) possibility this technique raises (if it works with adult somatic
cells as it did with fetal cells) is that an adult might have him or herself
cloned, but add genes or partial gene sequences to his or her genome to try
to enhance or better the clone. The enhanced clone would then not be
genetically identical, but "better" in terms of height, immune system,
intelligence, or whatever genes could be successfully added to the cell that
serves as a nucleus to the enucleated egg. This prospect could hold mass
appeal, and deserves much more attention than mere replication does.
Although NBAC could not agree on much, it did conclude that any
attempt to clone a human being should be prohibited by basic ethical
principles that prohibit putting human subjects at significant risk without
their informed consent. Dolly's birth was a 1-in-277-embryo chance."
The experiment has yet to be repeated, and in early 1998 Wilmut himself
said he thought it would take more than 1,000 tries before he could clone
another lamb from a somatic cell.5" The birth of a human from cloning
might be technologically possible, but we could only discover this by
unethically subjecting the planned child to the risk of serious genetic or
physical injury, and subjecting a planned child to this type or risk will
likely never be justified. Because we will likely never be able to protect
the human subject of cloning research from serious harm, the basic ethical
rules of human experimentation may always prohibit us from ever using it
on humans. On the other hand, safety is the same argument that was used
against trying IVF in humans; an argument that Baby Louise's birth

48 Angelika E. Shnieke et al., Human Factor IX Transgenic Sheep Produced by
Transfer of
Nuclei from Transfected Fetal Fibroblasts,278 SCIENCE 2130 (1997); see Robert L. Hotz, Scientists
Add Human Gene to Three Cloned Lambs, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 19, 1997, at Al.
49 Shnieke, supra note 48; see also Hotz, supra note 48.
50 Wilmut, supranote 1, at 811-12.
51 Gina B. Kolata, Creator of Cloned Sheep Says He Will Try to Repeat Process, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1998, at A7; Nicholas Wade, Scientist Who Announced Cloning of Sheep Is Taking Steps to
Win over Critics,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1998, at A6.
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falsified. Because danger itself will not prevent scientists and physicians
from first-of-their-land experiments, from a baboon heart in a baby to an
artificial heart in an adult, and because the technique may be both safer and
more efficient in the future, we must identify a stronger basis on which to
resist human cloning in the long term.
Virtually all those who have studied the matter have concluded that a
broad-based public panel is needed to oversee human experimentation in
the areas of genetic engineering, human reproduction, xenografts, artificial
organs, and other boundary-crossing experiments. Any new national
regulatory panel must be composed almost exclusively of nonresearchers
and nonphysicians so it can reflect public values, not parochial concerns.
One of the most important procedural steps a federal Human
Experimentation Agency could take would be to put the burden of proof on
those who propose to do novel experiments that call deeply held societal
values into question, including cloning. I continue to think that this shift in
the burden of proof is critical to effective societal influence over science,
and is the most important point I tried to make in my testimony before a
United States Senate committee, at which Ian Wilmut also testified, in
March 1997.52 Without this shift, social control is not possible. This
model applies the precautionary principle of international environmental
law to cloning. The principle requires governments to protect public health
and the environment even in the absence of clear evidence of harm. 3
Under it, human cloning proponents would have the burden of proving that
there is an important societal purpose for such an experiment before it is
permitted, rather than the regulators having the burden of proving that
there is some compelling reason not to approve it. This regulatory scheme
would depend upon at least a de facto if not de jure ban or moratorium on
such experiments before their societal approval. Is this possible?54
VII. MORATORIA AND BANS ON HUMAN CLONING

It has been almost thirty years since James Watson first suggested the
world might want to outlaw human cloning, although no serious thought
was given to this prospect until 1997. Is a worldwide ban possible?
Reaction to the birth of Dolly almost exclusively centered on such a ban.
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53 See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. &
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54 For arguments against a ban see GINA B. KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD
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Countries around the world, including France, China, Argentina, and Iran,
almost immediately adopted bans and called upon the world community to
enact an international ban. Such a ban was also urged on the world by the
G-7 countries, meeting in Denver in June 1997. Only in the United States,
leaders of the other countries suggested, would government hesitate to ban
use of cloning a technology in humans on the basis of personal liberty or
choice.
President Clinton initially said he would wait ninety days for his
ethics advisory board to report to him on what to do, but a few days later
he issued an executive order outlawing the use of any federal funds to do
research designed to produce a human clone, 5 and urged private industry
to voluntarily refrain from human cloning research. Ninety days later his
advisory board (the NBAC) recommended a time-limited ban of three to
five years on the creation of a human "delayed genetic twin" by somatic
cell transfer, during which time more discussion and debate could take
place.56 This recommendation was adopted primarily on the basis that
attempting human cloning at this time is too dangerous to the physical
health of the resulting child. The chair of the board, Harold Shapiro, wrote
in Science, in explaining the recommendation, that the board had to
consider "vitally important social and constitutional issues," listing as the
first one, "protecting the widest possible sphere of personal choice.""
On the recommendation of NBAC, the White House sent proposed
legislation to Congress on June 9, 1997.
The proposed "Cloning
Prohibition Act of 1997" would outlaw human cloning for the next five
years.58 The operative portion of the proposal is its prohibition: "It shall
be unlawful for any person or other legal entity, public or private, to
perform or use somatic cell nuclear transfer with the intent of introducing
the product of that transfer into a woman's womb or in any other way
59
creating a human being.
"Somatic cell nuclear transfer" is defined as "the transfer of a cell
nucleus from a somatic cell into an egg from which the nucleus has been

55 President's Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal Funding for
Cloning of Human
Beings, 33 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997).

56 NATIONAL BIOETHICs ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING
HUMAN BEINGS:
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 107-10 (1997).
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removed."' The proposed Act specifically does not prohibit or restrict any
other type of research, including: "(1) the use of somatic cell nuclear
transfer or other cloning technologies to clone molecules, DNA, cells, and
tissues; or (2) the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer techniques to create
animals."61 Penalties for violation of the prohibition are a fine of
"$250,000 or two times the gross gain or loss from the offense," whichever
is greater.62
The Clinton proposal joined several others in Congress and almost a
dozen in various states.6" Because it is specific about both what it seeks to
outlaw (the replication of an existing or deceased human being by somatic
cell transfer) and what it permits (all other cloning techniques), it is the
most understandable. The President's laudable goal is to prohibit the
cloning of a human while permitting a wide range of other cloning
research.' His bill, for example, would not prohibit cloning by embryo
splitting, although to prevent the creation of a "delayed genetic twin" all
such embryos must be implanted at the same time. Virtually all other
proposals have definitional problems so severe that they are either too
vague to provide guidance or overly broad in their reach. For example, a
Senate bill introduced by Christopher Bond (R-Missouri) defined cloning
as "the replication of a human individual by the taking of a cell with
genetic material and the cultivation of the cell through the egg, embryo,
fetal, and newborn stage into a new human individual."6 This seems to
permit research through implantation and fetal development. A House
version, introduced by Vern Ehler (R-Michigan), defined cloning as "the
use of a human somatic cell for the process of producing a human clone.'."
What exactly this means is unclear.
60 Id. § 4(c).

61 Id. § 7(a).
62 Id.
63 S. 1599, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1574, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1601, 105th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1602, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); S. 1611, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998);
H.R. 3133, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); H.R. 922, 105th Cong., IstSess. (1997); H.R. 923, 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
State proposed bans on cloning and cloning research include: S.B. 68, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1998); H.B.
5475, Reg. Sess. (Conn.1998). H.B. 3206, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997); S.B. 411, 110th Gen. Assembly, 2d
Sess. (Ind. 1998); H.B. 2846, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 1998); H.B. 932, Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998); S.B.
864, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1998); H.B. 1658, 155th Sess., 2d year (N.H. 1998); A.B. 329, 208th
Leg. (N.J. 1998); S.B. 218, 122d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1998); H.B. 7123 (RI. 1998); H.B.
3617, 112th Sess. (S.C. 1998); S.B. 2295, 100th Gen. Assembly (Tenn. 1998); H.B. 1237, Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1997); H.B. 1508, 144th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997); S.B. 2235, 90th Gen. Assembly,
Reg. Sess. (Ili. 1997); H.F. 2730, 80th Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997).
64 President's Message, supra note 58, §§ 3, 6.
65 S.368, 105 Cong., Ist
Sess. § 1(b) (1997).
6 H.R. 922, 105 Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1997).
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In early 1998 a Chicago physicist, Richard Seed made national news
by announcing that he intended to raise funds to clone a human.67 Because
Seed lacked both the scientific knowledge and laboratory tools to attempt
cloning and had no understanding of the ethical controversies involving
cloning or research on children, his proposal was greeted with almost
universal condemnation.68 Like the 1978 Rorvik hoax, however, it did
provide another opportunity for public discussion of cloning, and President
Clinton took the opportunity to renew his call for federal legislation
outlawing human cloning. The Seed affair provided the impetus to get the
President's proposal introduced into Congress, but only as a reasonable
alternative to a much more draconian Senate Bill, S. 1601, that would have
outlawed not only the attempt to clone a human being, but all cellular
cloning based on the creation of human embryos for research. This anticell cloning bill was rejected by the United States Senate in February 1998.
The Clinton proposal seems to have been modeled on California's
draft legislation, which in modified form became the first law in the United
States outlawing human cloning in October 1997.69 The California law
imposes a five-year moratorium on human cloning and selling gametes,
embryos, or fetuses for human cloning. Under the law, cloning
means the practice of creating or attempting t9 create a human being by
transferring the nucleus from a human cell from whatever source into a
human egg cell from which the nucleus has been removed for the purpose of,
or to implant, the resulting product to initiate a pregnancy that could result in
70
the birth of a human being.
Because it ignored the rich literature on cloning, the NBAC was
unable to do more than recommend that they be given another five years to
study the problem of human cloning. This is reasonable, but much too
narrow. Cloning is unique, but the concerns it raises are not. If choice is
the only rationale for cloning, for example, there is no sufficient rationale
for human cloning. The moratorium deserves to be made permanent in the
form of a ban, and we should use it as an opportunity both to develop a
national human experimentation agency and to foster international
cooperation in the regulation of human research that affects us all.
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Treating infertility by using the new reproductive technologies has
become a multibillion dollar business that is itself dominated not by the
medical ideology of the best interests of patients and their children, but by
the market ideology of profit maximization under the guise of reproductive
liberty. Government in our constitutional, democratic society has the
authority to make reasonable regulations to manage the market in a way
that protects the interests of the public, prospective parents, and their future
children. The domination of the divisive and narrow abortion debate has
meant that the federal government has not played any role for almost two
decades in the regulation of embryo research or of clinical application of
the new reproductive technologies. This inactivity must end as we attempt
to replace the ideology of the market with an ideology of human welfare
that takes its responsibility to future generations seriously.
In this respect, I can conclude the discussion of choice and cloning on
the same note with which I opened this Commentary-the curse of being
an echo. The primary reason for banning human cloning was articulated by
philosopher Hans Jonas in the early 1970s. He correctly noted that it does
not matter that creating an exact duplicate of an existing person is
physically and psychologically impossible. What matters is that a specific
person is chosen to be cloned because of some characteristic or
characteristics that person possesses (and, it is hoped, would be also
possessed by the copy or clone). Jonas argued that cloning is a crime
against the clone, the crime of depriving the clone of his or her "existential
right to certain subjective terms of his being"-most particularly, the "right
to ignorance" of facts (about his original) that are likely to be "paralyzing
for the spontaneity of becoming himself."'" This advance knowledge of
what another has or has not accomplished with the clone's genome
destroys the clone's "condition [for] authentic growth" in seeking to
answer the fundamental question of all our beings, "Who am I?" Jonas
continues:
In brief [the clone] is antecedently robbed of the freedom which only under
the protection of ignorance can thrive; and to rob a human-to-be of that
freedom deliberately is an inexpiable crime that must not be committed even
once ...

•.. The ethical command here entering the enlarged stage of our powers
is: never to violate the right to that ignorance which is a condition ...

of
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authentic action; or: to respect the right of each human life to find its own
way and be a surpriseto itself.72

Jonas is correct. His argument applies only to a "delayed genetic
twin" created from an existing human, not to genetic twins born at the
same time. Even if one does not agree with Jonas, however, it is
hypocritical to argue that a cloning technique that limits the liberty and
choices of the resulting child can be justified on the basis that cloning
expands the liberty and choices of would-be cloners. There is more at
stake here than a hollow chant of choice.
To summarize, there are a series of reasons to ban human cloning. At
the individual/family level there is the issue of human experimentation and
the danger to the health of the clone. More is the Echo-Narcissus
syndrome: The parent who is so in love with himself or herself that only a
duplicate can fulfill their yearning for perfection (but this yearning can
never be fulfilled and will only result in disappointment and death); and the
child-clone who is cursed by its parent never to speak first, but only to be
an echo of the parent's already-lived life. Cloning is simultaneously selfindulgent and self-destructive, and creates a child with a curse rather than a
blessing. At the societal level, cloning threatens to change the value of
children by seeing them as products made to order, and all humans by
undermining the uniqueness of every individual on which human dignity is
based. Finally, at the species level, cloning changes the essence of human
sexuality by abolishing the necessity of sexual reproduction, and with it our
concepts of fertility and infertility.
VIII. CATEGORIES AND CLONING
French philosopher Michel Foucault writes that a passage from the
great Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges incited him to write an entire
book exploring how science and society categorize or order things, entitled
The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences." The passage
quotes "a 'certain Chinese encyclopaedia"' which divides animals into
"'(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs,
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present
classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine
camelhair brush, (1)
et cetera,(in) having just broken the water pitcher, (n)
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that from a long way off look like flies."' 74 Borges did not add (but we
can) "(o) cloned lambs," to his list. While each separate category is
possible, Foucault (who writes that he could hardly stop laughing, albeit
uneasily, at this ordering), observes that the "monstrous quality" in this
categorization is the fact that "the common ground" on which a
"meetingf[" of all of these animals would be possible "has itself been
destroyed."75 We can thus never find a container to accommodate all of the
entries. Put another way, "Absurdity destroys the and of the enumeration
by making impossible the in where the things enumerated would be
divided up."76
Foucault was concerned with order (and disorder) and how society
orders things to make meaning out of them. Focault was not so much
interested in proving the "truth" of life, as he was in understanding why we
think the way we do, and therefore what things seem normal or natural to
us. The question of human cloning can usefully be examined from a
categorical ordering perspective. More precisely, where does cloning
"fit"? If we put cloning into the category of human reproduction, it will be
in a list including such things as in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, and
artificial insemination, and we will judge it through the same lens that we
have judged these other methods of "artificial reproduction." We could
also put it in an ordered list of embryo manipulations, a list of scientific
challenges, or a list of manufactured products. I think the list it fits into is
a different list altogether. It is a list of types of asexual reproduction or
replication. Other possibilities include a list of science fiction scenarios, a
list of unnatural activities, and a list of crimes against humanity. The list
into which we fit human cloning matters-and will likely determine how
society both in the United States and the world deals with it.
Cloning does not "fit into" the category of international crimes
against humanity: (a) genocide, (b) murder, (c) torture, (d) slavery. Indeed,
the international preoccupation with human cloning can be made to seem
absurd in the company of these twentieth century horrors. Cloning would,
however, fit well in a list of things that should never be done to children,
including female genital mutilation, forced labor, nonconsensual
reproduction, and sterilization. For children, it is a form of child abuse,
asexual child abuse. An international ban on human cloning could be the
first entry into a new category of international bioethics crimes: (a) human
cloning. The clear implication would be that this category should grow
and that effective transnational enforcement mechanisms should be
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created. On this view, which I think is the proper one, the prospect of
human cloning provides the world community with a rare, perhaps unique,
opportunity to agree that something that can be done scientifically to
change the nature of humanity should not be done. This agreement could
(and should) serve as a model for much wider international cooperation
and regulation in the bioethics and genetics spheres generally.
Other possible entries to this now only imagined (and invisible)
category could be (b) research on humans without consent, and (c)
physician killing (with or without patient consent). Choice seems a
mistaken category for cloning, just as children seem an improper entry
under the category products. Like the sheep the little prince finally
accepted because he could not see it in its enclosed box, all human children
should have the right to live an uncharted life, a life filled with choices
they must make themselves, not choices forced on them by another's
fixation on duplicating or copying parts of an already-lived life.

